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The Problem of Logic. BOYCE GIBSON. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1908. Pp. ix + 500.

Mr. Gibson tells us in his preface that the work under consideration has "grown up and taken shape under the chastening influence of college teaching." It is, therefore, not to be expected that the volume should be a contribution to the advancement of logical thought, but the reader may demand of it a clear and consistent point of view with respect to the matter involved, and in this he will not be disappointed. It is a work preeminently suited to the needs of the teacher of logic who is annoyed by the lack of precision and consistency in most contemporary works and who lacks either the time or the interest to reorganize thoroughly his own opinions.

It is impossible to consider a book such as this in detail, but there are certain general features that at once warm our hearts: for example, while current formal logic does not loudly demand a philosophic background, the need is nevertheless implicit, and it is refreshing to find it frankly recognized: "I am, indeed, persuaded that the drift of the present work is convergent with the line of the Pragmatic Reformation, and that the stress laid on relevancy is a vital bond of union between ourselves and the pragmatists." The author's philosophy is not thoroughly pragmatic, but its idealistic elements do not bear weightily on logic. Mr. Gibson offers the following provisional definition of truth: "Truth is the unity of ideas as systematically organized through the control exercised by relevant fact," and, throughout, the constant references to this control are of primary importance.

From a reviewer's point of view the book falls into four parts: (§ I.-II.) the relation of logic to language, *i. e.*, the function of words, definition, the predicables, division, classification, scientific terminology and nomenclature, connotation and denotation, concrete and abstract terms; (§ III.-IV.) the logical proposition, its forms, meanings, and relations to the laws of thought; (§ V.-IX) formal deduction and its fallacies; (§ X.-XIV.) induction.

The first part is developed under the concept of meaning, or that which tells us what an object is in relation to a specified interest or purpose. Its details might well be the grounds of considerable comment, but such comment would be in the interest of greater simplicity and propriety in the use of language only. For example, is it necessary or expedient to define *intension* so that *intension* equals *connotation* + *denotation* (p. 72)? Mr. Gibson has at least expressed himself clearly, although he seems to us to have been everywhere too anxious to make a place for traditional expressions instead of meditating on the utility of Occam's razor.

The concept of meaning dominates the second part of this work also. The most interesting feature here is the treatment of the principle of identity as an Hegelian identity-in-difference (p. 97), in which form, the author seems to think, this law may be *the* law of thought, although he adds, as a concession, the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle. To Professor Stout is attributed an important section disclaiming, on

excellent and sound grounds, the relating of these laws to time. The forms of the traditional analyses of propositions are retained and given meaning in rather satisfactory fashion, considering that modern symbolic logic is wholly ignored; this appears, for example, in the emphasis of "genuine logical denial," and in the assertion of the irreducibility of hypotheticals to categoricals (p. 139) which assertion has meaning, but probably not within the purpose of formalism.

Formal inference is introduced as a substitution of the validity interest for the truth interest, and the extensive point of view is "selected as most adequately meeting the requirements of a formal logical treatment." Existential questions which threaten the validity of Darapti, Fesapo, and Bramintip, are entirely untouched, and the short section devoted to unorthodox syllogisms, such as "X is greater than Y, Y is greater than Z, etc.," is inadequate and somewhat inaccurate: for example, the copula in the simple categorical syllogism is stated as = (p. 251)—an absurdity when the extensive point of view has been adopted. The examples are excellent and especially so in the well-classified treatment of fallacies, which includes detailed formal discussion of such classic arguments as Zeno's paradoxes (p. 290), and the Litigiousus (p. 293). Inference is justified against Mill's criticisms because its end is not novelty but logical irresistibility.

The section devoted to induction is most touched by the pragmatic wand. Fidelity to relevant fact is the expression of the truth interest, and therefore induction proper includes Mill's induction, deduction, and verification. Why might not the book have had a better form and expressed this in its order of exposition? Again, the working out of the examples is most commendable (cf. the development of astronomical theory, pp. 329–333, and especially, Ch. XLVI., pp. 422–444). The inductive postulate is determinism.

The author promises a sequel that shall deal "with the logical problem in its more philosophical aspects" (p. viii) and which may discuss the principles of mathematics in their logical bearing. But while not contesting the interest and importance of symbolic logic, the incorporation of it into the massive promised system is looked upon as improbable, or impossible, and if the incorporation of it were to mean a new and exhaustive statement of its results in their details the reviewer would heartily say Amen! but when symbolic logic, moved by the consistency interest, seems able to do away with the distinction between positive and negative propositions, and when Mrs. Ladd-Franklin has demonstrated that one simple form underlies all syllogistic, it is unfortunate that those whose interest moves them to undertake such exhaustive treatments of logic should not try to incorporate some of these results in their systems, and so make way with at least a part of that cumbrous machinery inherited from antiquity, which logicians still accept, patch up, and transmit to the next generation.

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